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This paper considers a consumption-based asset pricing model where housing is explicitly modeled
both as an asset and as a consumption good. Nonseparable preferences describe households' concern
with composition risk, that is, fluctuations in the relative share of housing in their consumption
basket. Since the housing share moves slowly, a concern with composition risk induces low
frequency movements in stock prices that are not driven by news about cash flow. Moreover, the
model predicts that the housing share can be used to forecast excess returns on stocks. We document
that this indeed true in the data. The presence of composition risk also implies that the riskless rate
is low which further helps the model improve on the standard CCAPM.
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Real estate is an important asset that pays oﬀ housing services, a major consumption good. Nev-
ertheless, existing literature on consumption-based asset pricing has paid no particular attention
to housing. Indeed, the standard CCAPM approach works with preferences deﬁned over a single
aggregate consumption good that lumps together housing services with other “nondurables and ser-
vices.” It is also common to identify a claim to all future consumption, including housing services,
with equity.
This paper explores the simplest consumption-based asset pricing model that reserves an explicit
role for housing. A representative agent consumes housing services and a numeraire (non-housing)
consumption good, both of which can be purchased in frictionless markets. In addition to a claim
to future numeraire, the agent is endowed with a housing stock that provides housing services. We
calibrate this model to US consumption data and derive predictions for asset prices. We ﬁnd that
it delivers a simple explanation for the long horizon predictability of excess stock returns.
The standard CCAPM focuses on investors’ concern with consumption risk – asset prices are
driven by changes in the conditional distribution of a single factor, aggregate consumption growth.
However, actual consumption-savings decisions depend not only on the uncertain overall size of
future consumption bundles, but also on their uncertain composition, for example between housing
and other consumption. This composition risk takes center stage in the present paper – changes in
the expenditure share on housing emerge as a second factor that drives asset prices.
In the standard model, investors’ concern with consumption risk implies that stock prices move
with the business cycle. In recessions, investors expect higher future consumption and try to sell
stocks today to increase current consumption. This intertemporal substitution mechanism drives
down stock prices in bad times. In our model, investors’ concern with composition risk implies
that recessions are perceived as particularly severe when the share of housing consumption is low.
In severe recessions, a new intertemporal substitution mechanism thus increases the downward
pressure on stock prices.
2Stock price movements generated by this new mechanism are not only larger, but also qualita-
tively more realistic than those generated by the standard CCAPM. On the one hand, they occur
at frequencies that are much lower than business cycle frequencies, as do stock price movements in
the data. The reason our model predicts low frequency swings in stock prices is that the housing
share changes slowly over time, so that severe recessions are rare. On the other hand, a concern
with composition risk generates price movements in the absence of news about future cash ﬂow
or dividends. Indeed, stock prices are volatile in our model even if dividend growth is close to
unforecastable, as it is in the data.
Investors’ concern with composition risk also suggests a simple explanation for observed long-
horizon predictability of excess stock returns. Indeed, severe recessions lead to drops in stock prices
– and hence increases in expected capital gains – that are not accompanied by large increases in
the riskless interest rate. This is because severe recessions typically go along with an increase in
the conditional volatility of the housing share. But an increase in composition risk strengthens
investors’ precautionary savings motive. For riskfree assets, precautionary saving thus mitigates
downward pressure on prices caused by the intertemporal substitution mechanism. As a result,
bond prices – and hence interest rates – move less than stock prices. Precautionary savings in the
face of composition risk also implies that the riskfree rate should be on average lower than what
the CCAPM predicts – composition risk thus helps resolve the riskfree rate puzzle.
Our model rationalizes why standard ﬁnancial indicator variables that involve normalized stock
prices, such as the price-dividend ratio and the price-earnings ratio, help forecast excess stock re-
turns. At the same time, it predicts that the expenditure share on housing should forecast excess
stock returns. We document that this is indeed the case in the data. This result is remarkable
because the housing share is a macroeconomic aggregate. In contrast to other common predictor
variables, it is not constructed from stock prices themselves. We show that the forecasting power
of the housing share increases with the forecast horizon, as does that of the price-dividend ratio.
According to our model, this is because high frequency noise due to changes in numeraire consump-
tion growth becomes less relevant at long horizons, where composition risk considerations matter
relatively more.
3Composition risk plays a subordinate role in the standard CCAPM, because the empirical im-
plementation of that model relies on aggregate price and quantity indices from the National Income
and Product Accounts (NIPA). It is thus implicitlyassumed that NIPA statisticianscorrectly model
investors’ preferences over housing services and other consumption. In the present paper, we ex-
plicitly model preferences over multiple goods: we work with power utility over a CES quantity
index that aggregates housing and other consumption. With nonseparable utility, a concern for
composition matters for asset pricing because housing consumption aﬀects the marginal utility of
numeraire (non-housing) consumption. The resulting pricing kernel is closely tied to macroeconomic
data and tightly parameterized. In particular, it depends on the discount factor, the coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion, and the intratemporal elasticity of substitution ε between housing and other
consumption.
Measuring the real quantity of housing services is diﬃcult. Readily available measures such as
square footage only reﬂect one input into the production of housing services, and the aggregation
of inputs involves diﬃcult quality judgments. In fact, a number of recent studies, including the
Boskin Commission Report (Boskin et al. 1996), have argued that NIPA real housing quantities are
grossly mismeasured. For us, this measurement issue creates two problems. First, we cannot obtain
a reliable estimate of the intratemporal elasticity directly from quantity data. Second, it is not
desirable to specify the forcing process of the model in terms of real consumption - or, equivalently,
real dividends from the two trees. Such a process would have to be estimated using real housing
services data, which is likely to produce misleading results for asset pricing.
However, we show that the pricing kernel of a multi-good asset pricing model can be written
in terms of the consumption of one of the goods (in our case, non-housing consumption) as well
as the expenditure shares of the other goods. Data on aggregate housing expenditure is arguably
more reliable than data on real housing consumption since its construction involves fewer quality
judgments. We thus take as our forcing process the joint distribution of non-housing consumption
growth and the expenditure share on housing. The asset pricing properties of the model can then
be fully characterized without recourse to quantity data, avoiding the second problem above. In
addition, asset prices are informative about the value of the intratemporal elasticity, which helps
with the ﬁrst problem.
4Quantitatively, the model generates a sizeable and volatile equity premium together with a low
and smooth riskless rate, and it replicates predictability regressions based on the price dividend
ratio and the housing share well. We obtain these results for either of two parameterizations.
First, we set the intratemporal elasticity to 1.25. This value is close to the point estimate from a
cointegrating regression with NIPA data. We also choose high values for the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion and the discount factor, 16 and 1.24, respectively. As a second parameterization, we
use risk aversion of 5 and a discount factor of .99 – standard values in the literature – and set the
intratemporal elasticity to 1.05.
Under both parameterizations, the asset pricing moments are essentially the same; in particular,
the equity premium is 3.5 percent, the volatility of excess stock returns is about 11 percent and
the riskfree rate has a mean of 1.8 percent as well as a volatility of less than 1 percent. In the
second case, the premium is thus sizeable and the riskfree rate is low although risk aversion and
the discount factor are low and there is no idiosyncratic risk. This is because the volatility of
“true” aggregate consumption growth – that is, changes in the unobservable ideal quantity index
implied by preferences – is about 5 times larger than the volatility of NIPA consumption growth.
In contrast, in our ﬁrst case, model-implied and NIPA consumption volatility are roughly the same.
We conclude that introducing composition risk helps understand why excess returns are pre-
dictable and also makes a partial, but quantitativelyrelevant, contributionto resolvingthe volatility
and equity premium puzzles. As in previous studies, a high equity premium must be due either
to high risk aversion or to high perceived risk. In our context, high perceived risk means high
composition risk, which translates into high volatility of the unobservable “true” aggregate con-
sumption process. Such volatility is compatible with smooth consumption expenditure in the data.
Importantly, though, whatever the source of premia and volatility, the mechanism for predictabil-
ity described above operates, as long as the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is above one.
Severe recessions (in which the housing share falls) then lead to drops in stock prices that are not
associated with bad news about dividends or increases in the riskless interest rate.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses related work. Section III presents the model
and derives our pricing equations. Section IV documents key properties of the data. Section V
speciﬁes the forcing process for the model and documents properties of equilibrium returns. The
5Appendix contains additional results.
II Related Work
This paper is the ﬁrst to derive the eﬀects of housing on asset prices in a general equilibrium
model. Existing general equilibrium models with housing include Davis and Heathcote (2005), who
explore the business cycle implications of an RBC model with a construction sector, and Ortalo-
Magne and Rady (2006), who analyze an overlapping generations model to study prices and volume
in the housing market. None of these papers is concerned with ﬁnancial assets. Portfoliochoice with
exogenous returns in the presence of housing is considered by Cocco (2005), Flavin and Yamashita
(2002), and Flavin and Nakagawa (2005).
Consumption-based asset pricing models traditionally assume that there is a single consump-
tion good. In the standard model, equity is represented by a single “tree,” the “fruit” of which
corresponds to aggregate dividends. The one-good assumption is also maintained in models that
- like ours - feature multiple trees, such as Menzly, Santos, and Veronesi (2004) or Cochrane,
Longstaﬀ, and Santa-Clara (2005). The distinctive feature of our model is that fruit from two trees
are not perfect substitutes in the utility function. This assumption is natural since one of our trees
represents the housing stock that provides a unique fruit, namely housing services.
Eichenbaum, Hansen, and Singleton (1988) and Jagannathan and Wang (1996) show that non-
separable utility over consumption and leisure does not help explain mean asset returns. Santos
and Veronesi (2005) show that the ratio of consumption to labor income forecasts stock returns.
However, their pricing kernel is the same as in the standard model, because utility is separable in
consumption and leisure. Their result therefore does not arise from composition risk as we have
deﬁned it.
Dunn and Singleton (1986), Eichenbaum and Hansen (1990) and Heaton (1993, 1995) consider
the consumption Euler equation when utility depends on services from consumer durables. They
show that adding consumer durables does not help understand the level of the equity premium.
In a more recent contribution to this literature, Yogo (2006) shows that, conditional on high risk
6aversion, a model with consumer durables can account for time variation in the equity premium,
well as the size and value premia. The deﬁnition of durables in these papers does not include real
estate, while our paper focuses exclusively on real estate. Moreover, we would like to address the
volatility puzzle, which leads us to determine asset prices endogenously from our model.
A key diﬀerence between real estate and other durables is that NIPA provides a direct measure
of service ﬂow for the former, whereas it only reports expenditure on the latter. This unique role
of housing services data is also recognized in the literature on home production. For example, Ben-
habib, Rogerson, and Wright (1991), Greenwood, Rogerson, and Wright (1995), and McGrattan,
Rogerson, and Wright (1997) consider models with nonseparable preferences over a home- and a
market-produced good. The home-produced good contains housing services, with housing capital
as one of the inputs. These papers are interested in the production side, especially the allocation
of labor between the home and market production sectors. In the present paper, our focus on asset
pricing leads us to abstract from the production side.
The pricing kernel implied by our model is driven by a persistent, heteroskedastic state variable,
the housing share. In this respect, our pricing kernel resembles that in Campbell and Cochrane
(1999). These authors propose a model in which agents consume a single good, but want to “catch
up with the Joneses.” Their pricing kernel depends on what they call the consumption-surplus
ratio, a parametric function of past aggregate consumption, the parameters of which are inferred
from asset market data. The consumption-surplus ratio is persistent and heteroskedastic, which is
important for the model to tightly match stock return dynamics. While our model does not perform
as well as the Campbell-Cochrane model, our pricing kernel is arguably more closely tied to macro
data. Since the housing share is observable, we can estimate persistence and heteroskedasticity
directly.1
Our results conﬁrm the ﬁndings in Cochrane (1991, 1996)who investigatesreal estate investment
as a pricing factor in a production-based approach. Cochrane (1991) documents that real-estate
investment growth predicts stock returns. Cochrane (1996) ﬁnds that real-estate investment growth
1Another diﬀerence is that expenditure shares are bounded. As a result, marginal utility in our model is bounded
above by the standard expression c
−1/σ
t ,w h e r eσ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and ct is numeraire
consumption. This is in contrast to the Campbell-Cochrane model, where marginal utility increases without bound
as the consumption-surplus ratio goes to zero.
7matters for the cross section of stock returns. Kullmann (2002) conﬁrms the latter result with
alternative real-estate measures. Moreover, the important component in real-estate investment is
residential real estate, not commercial real-estate investment (Cochrane 1996, Table 9 on page 615).
These ﬁndings support our approach of introducing real estate using a consumption-based view,
where residential real estate matters to consumers.
Our model incorporates a minimal amount of frictions – the representative agent benchmark
we consider obtains when there are complete ﬁnancial markets, a perfect rental market for housing,
and no borrowing constraints. However, recent work by Lustig and Nieuwerburgh (2005) suggests
that the eﬀects we stress are relevant also when there are more frictions. Retaining the assumptions
of complete markets and a perfect rental market, these authors provide an aggregation result for
economies in which collateral constraints prevent perfect risk sharing. They show that the aggregate
expenditure share on housing enters the pricing kernel the same way as in our benchmark economy.
The new feature of their model is that the pricing kernel also contains a term that depends on the
wealth distribution. This latter term – due to incomplete risk sharing, as in Constantinides and
Duﬃe (1996) – further improves the performance of the model.
III Model
A. Setup


















and σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. For low values of σ, agents are unwilling to
substitute aggregate consumption over time.
8Aggregate consumption itself is a quantity index that aggregates two goods, housing services,
or shelter, st, and non-housing consumption ct, deﬁned as consumption of all nondurables and
services except housing services:












The parameter ε represents the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between housing services
and non-housing consumption. For high values of ε, agents are willing to substitute the two goods
within each period. The two goods become perfect substitutes as ε →∞and perfect complements
as ε → 0.2 Taking the limit as ε → 1 yields the Cobb-Douglas form. If ε = σ, utility is separable.
Let ps
t and pc
t denote prices of housing and non-housing consumption respectively. The price ps
t
can be interpreted as rent in a perfect rental market. There are two assets in positive net supply.
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t denote asset holdings. The economy is summarized by the preference parameters β,
ω, σ,a n dε,a sw e l la ss t o c h a s t i cp r o c e s s e s{¯ ct, ¯ st} for output of the two goods. In equilibrium, we
must have ct =¯ ct, st =¯ st and θs
t = θc





such that the processes of consumption bundles {¯ ct, ¯ st} and portfolio holdings θs
t = θc
t = 1 maximize
utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (3).
Interpretation
We have chosen to focus on the consumption side of housing. As a result, our model only restricts
the joint behavior of asset prices and housing consumption; it has nothing to say about quantity
2We use standard Hicksian language here: two goods are substitutes if and only if ε>1. This property can be
inferred from data on relative prices and quantities, and has nothing to do with the agent’s intertemporal concern
for smoothing consumption. Some papers refer to u12 < 0 as the case where numeraire and shelter are “substitutes”,
while the case u12 > 0 is referred as “complements”. We refrain from this language here, since the second derivative
of the utility function captures both intertemporal and intratemporal tradeoﬀs.
9data from the production side, such as residential investment. Incorporating a richer production
structure is an important issue for future research. However, the advantage of our approach is
that it is compatible with many diﬀerent structures on the production side. For example, our
approach allows us to abstract from important production-side features such as adjustment costs
and indivisibility.
We view housing services as a ﬁnal good that can be home-produced (by owner-occupiers) or
market-produced (by landlords). In either case, the production of housing services involves a variety
of diﬀerent inputs, such as housing capital, time and materials spent on upkeep of the house, access
to facilities, and even the nature of neighbors and the number of people living in a house. Among
these inputs, some are ﬁxed in the short run, while others can be adjusted quickly at little cost. To
model the production side, we would have to take these factor-speciﬁc adjustment costs explicitly
into account. Here we are only interested in preferences over the ﬁnal good, the supply of which
we take to be exogenous and competitively priced.
This perspective also helps to clarify the nature of ﬂuctuations in housing-services consumption
at the individual level. Importantly, these ﬂuctuations should not be thought of as simply ﬂuctu-
ations in square footage or other physical measures of housing capital. After all, housing capital
is only one input into the production of housing services. In the short run, the variable inputs
listed above are likely to account for a larger part of the volatility. The situation is analogous to
the production of non-housing consumption goods, which also involves factors that are diﬃcult to
adjust, such as commercial real estate, machines, and equipment.
In the medium run, another important source of shocks to the quantity of housing services
is distortionary regulation. For example, rent control eﬀectively distorts the factor mix in the
production of housing services. The control caps the price of the ﬁnal good based on the quantity
of a particular input, usually the amount of space. As a result, ﬁrms change the factor mix to
produce lower quality housing for the given space (see Malpezzi and Turner 2003 for evidence on
this eﬀect). This means that the introduction or abolition of rent control can be viewed as shocks to
the production side of the economy. Consumers’ ﬁrst-order conditions over the ﬁnal goods housing
services and non-housing consumption hold with or without rent control.
10B. Pricing Kernel
To evaluate the model using asset prices and returns quoted in dollars, we need to choose a nu-
meraire. Withmultiple goods, this choice is not obvious and has importantconsequences for pricing.
Throughout much of the paper, we will use non-housing consumption as the numeraire. We now
derive the pricing kernel for this case. The agents’ Euler equation implies that the price-dividend
ratio vt of a claim to the nominal dividend stream {Dt} solves
(4) vt = Et
 









where dividends are deﬂated by the price pc
t of non-housing consumption.
The pricing kernel is the present value of an extra unit of non-housing consumption tomorrow:
(5) Mt+1 = β
u  (Ct+1) g1 (ct+1,s t+1)




























The pricing kernel consists of two terms. The ﬁrst term is familiar from the standard one-good
model with power utility. It reﬂects agents’ concern with (numeraire) consumption risk: numeraire
payoﬀs are valued more highly in states of the world where numeraire consumption growth is low.
The higher the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion 1/σ, the larger is the eﬀect of consumption risk.
If utility over numeraire consumption and other consumption goods is separable (ε = σ), the second
term in the pricing kernel collapses to 1, and consumption risk alone matters for asset pricing.
When utility is nonseparable, the pricing kernel also reﬂects consumers’ concern with composi-
tion risk, captured by the second term. Suppose that the intratemporal elasticity of substitution
is larger than the intertemporal elasticity (ε>σ , or, equivalently, u12 < 0), the case we consider
below. The agent is now more willing to substitute between housing and other consumption within
a period than he is to substitute between overall consumption bundles at diﬀerent points in time.
As a result, numeraire is valued highly not only when numeraire consumption tomorrow is lower
than today, but also when the relative consumption of housing services tomorrow is lower than
today.
11In other words, numeraire is valued highly in recessions – as in the standard model – but it is
valued especially highly in severe recessions, when the relative quantity of housing consumption is
low. The marginal utility of an extra unit of non-housing consumption is high for severe recession
states, because the agent wants to compensate the future shortfall in housing services by substi-
tuting non-housing consumption. Consequently, an asset denominated in numeraire (non-housing)
consumption is more attractive if it pays out a lot when there is a relative shortfall of housing.
Prices, Quantities, and Expenditure Shares
The pricing kernel (5) involves real relative quantities st/ct. However, the price ps
t and quan-
tity st of housing services are diﬃcult to measure. We now show that the pricing kernel can be
equivalently written in terms of expenditure shares, for which available data are more reliable, as
















In words, the FOC says that the agent chooses housing and non-housing consumption in each period
so that the marginal rate of substitution between the two goods is equal to their price ratio. The
FOC thus implies that relative prices and relative quantities move in opposite directions for any
value of the elasticity of intratemporal substitution ε.




















This ratio can take values anywhere between 0 and inﬁnity. In equilibrium, the FOC thus creates
a one-to-one relationship between expenditure ratios, relative quantities, and relative prices. The
expenditure ratio moves with the relative quantity of non-housing consumption, and against its
relative price, if and only if the goods are Hicksian substitutes, that is, ε>1.
12Pricing Kernel in terms of Expenditure Shares











which is always between 0 and 1. With this deﬁnition, some algebra delivers a reformulation of the
pricing kernel (5), where the composition risk term depends only on the expenditure share as well
as the elasticities ε and σ:











In what follows, we focus on the case ε>1, where the expenditure share α – like the expenditure
ratio z – moves together with relative quantities. A severe recession – a state where the relative
consumption of housing is low – is thus associated with a high value of αt+1 and a high value of
the pricing kernel. We also maintain that intertemporal consumption smoothing is more important
than intratemporal smoothing (ε>σ ) – as before, a severe recession at t + 1 implies that the
pricing kernel is high.
The pricing kernel (9) clariﬁes the “two factor” structure of the pricing kernel. The standard
CCAPM without housing is a one factor model: the pricing kernel depends only on consumption
growth, and expected returns therefore depend exclusively on their correlation with consumption
growth. With nonseparable utility, the change in the expenditure share emerges as a second factor
in our “Housing CCAPM.” This composition risk factor drives the asset pricing performance of the
model. Indeed, numeraire (non-housing) consumption growth behaves much like NIPA aggregate
consumption growth: it is smooth, and its covariance with stock returns (denominated in units of
numeraire) is small and positive. With separable utility, tiny values of the intertemporal elasticity
σ would thus be needed to generate high equity premia. In Table 1 below, we document that
the covariance of stock returns with expenditure share growth Δlnαt+1 is negative. This means
that stocks have low payoﬀs during recessions, when non-housing consumption growth is low, and
especially low payoﬀs in severe recessions, when housing consumption is relatively low (and α is
high). This generates higher equity premia than under the standard model.
13C. Aggregate Consumption as Numeraire
In the previous subsection, we have used non-housing consumption as the numeraire. An alternative
is to use aggregate consumption. However, a key feature of our model is that aggregateconsumption
Ct is not deﬁned according to NIPA conventions, but according to equation (2). This implies
that both consumption and inﬂation series cannot be taken from NIPA but must be constructed
from disaggregated data to respect preferences. We now derive the appropriate pricing kernel and
inﬂation series. We then show that this choice of numeraire is less convenient for asset pricing than
simply working with non-housing consumption as the numeraire.
With aggregate consumption as the numeraire, the appropriate deﬂator for nominal dividends











The new deﬁnition of aggregate consumption entails the new true inﬂation rate Pt+1/Pt.
We can express both aggregate consumption growth and true inﬂation derived from our ideal
price index in terms of the (well-measured) inﬂation and real growth rates of non-housing consump-



































3For any quantity index g (c,s) that is homogenous of degree one, the ideal price index is the expenditure function
at utility level one, i.e.
p(p
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14which is based on a new pricing kernel, the present value of an extra unit of aggregate consumption
















Despite their formal similarity, the two Euler equations (4) and (11) point to two reasons why
asset pricing in our model will be diﬀerent from the standard CCAPM. First, consumption growth
measured by our quantity index Ct will behave diﬀerently from aggregate consumption growth
measured by NIPA. Second, our true inﬂation rate Pt+1/Pt will behave diﬀerently from the CPI
that is usually used to compute real returns. This will have important implications for excess
returns, an issue that we turn to next.
Numeraire Inﬂation and Excess Returns
One advantage of using non-housing consumption as the numeraire is that the inﬂation rate
for non-housing consumption is well-measured and behaves similarly to the CPI. In particular, it
is smooth enough to justify the common practice of equating nominal and real excess returns. In
contrast, for some parameterizations our constructed true inﬂation rate Pt+1/Pt for the aggregate
basket will be too volatile for this practice to be sensible. To see the issue, assume for the moment








= 1 must hold both for asset i and for the riskfree asset
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where lower case letters denote logarithmsand πt+1 =l npc
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t is the inﬂation rate for non-housing

































If non-housing inﬂation, or the CPI, is used to deﬂate returns, then the last term is small in the




In other words, with low inﬂation volatility, nominal excess returns r$i
t+1 − r
$f
t+1 are a good proxy
for the diﬀerence between the real return on asset i and a real riskfree asset, the particular excess
return that asset pricing models are typically interested in. More generally, this approximation is
not accurate.
IV Data
We now present the data used in our empirical work and discuss various measurement issues that
arise due to new aspects of our model that have to do with housing.
A. Data on Housing Consumption
To measure housing services, we rely on the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). For
each consumption category, the NIPA tables report 3 diﬀerent data series: dollar expenditures on
the item per period, a price index, and a quantity index. Unfortunately, the construction of both
price and quantity indices is based on the CPI rent component that has been criticized heavily
by a number of recent studies, including the Boskin Commission Report (Boskin et al. 1996),
Prescott (1997), Hobijn (2003) and Gordon and vanGoethem (2004). However, we now argue that
the criticism does not aﬀect the NIPA expenditure series.
The source of the NIPA service ﬂow data for housing are surveys. The questionnaires in these
surveys ask a group of households about the dollar amount they spend on housing each period.
More precisely, renters are asked for the dollar amount spent on rent, while owners are asked for a
dollar estimate of how much they would rent their house for.4 These dollar amounts are summed
up and reported in the NIPA tables as expenditure on housing services each period. The survey
data for years that NIPA calls “benchmark years” are from the Decennial Census of Housing and
the Survey of Residential Finance. These data are supplemented with additional surveys that are
4To the extent that owners make mistakes in estimating the rent on their house, these owner-imputed rent numbers
contain measurement error. There are studies that show that house owners only make small mistakes on average
when it comes to estimating the property value of their house (for example, Goodman and Ittner 1993). We are not
aware of similar studies that investigate the accuracy of rent estimates.
16conducted more frequently in the other, non-benchmark years. These surveys include the American
Housing Survey and the Current Population Survey. For more details, see U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis (1990, 2002).
The surveys measure expenditures on housing services per period in dollars, ps
tst. NIPA statisti-
cians take these dollar numbers and split them up into a price ps
t and a quantity st index. The split
is based on rent information provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the agency that computes
the Consumer Price Index. The problem with the rent component of the CPI is its treatment of
housing quality. For example, the Boskin Report documents that most houses today have indoor
plumbing, electricity, heating systems, air conditioning, and other amenities that were not around
in 1929, when the NIPA tables started. Moreover, the service provided by a house depends on its
surroundings, such as location, infrastructure, pollution etc. These surroundings have also changed
for the average house, as more and more people move to the south-west and move to the suburbs
(Glaeser and Gyourko 2005). The Boskin Report argues that CPI rents do not appropriately take
these quality changes into account.
Mismeasurement of the CPI rent component ps
t also aﬀects the quantity index st since it is
computed in NIPA by dividing dollar expenditures ps
tst by ps
t. We conclude that out of the three
series ps
tst, ps
t and st, expenditure is the only one that is not beset by measurement problems. This
motivates the use of expenditure data in the calibration.
Empirical Properties of the Aggregate Expenditure Share
Figure 1 shows the non-housing expenditure share αt as a black line. (The gray/green line is
the dividend-yield on stocks, but we will ignore it for the moment). The plot uses annual data from
NIPA Table 2.2 that goes back to 1929, instead of the short post-war quarterly NIPA sample. We
see that αt varies little over time, which means that consumers spend around the same fraction of
their total expenditures on non-housing consumption over time. The expenditure share ﬂuctuates
around an average value of 82.6 percent, as shown in Table 1, with a standard deviation of 1.5
percent. Figure 1 also shows some large movements in αt. These movements, and the associated
1.5 percent volatility number, already hint at one property of preferences for the representative
consumer, which is that they are not accurately described as Cobb-Douglas, since that would imply









































Figure 1: Expenditure share and dividend yield, annual data 1929-2001.
constant expenditure shares. But the volatility is low, which means that ε may not be far from
one.
If housing and non-housing consumption are substitutes (ε>1), movements in the non-housing
expenditure share αt correspond to movements in relative quantities ct/st. Figure 2 shows log
relative prices and relative quantities. The plot indicates strong trends in lnps
t/pc
t and, because of
the way the data is constructed, these trends lead to opposite trends in relative quantities lnst/ct.
In particular, housing services have become cheaper over time and, as the FOC (6) would predict,
more housing services were consumed. Despite these trends, the plot conﬁrms, together with Figure
1, that expenditure shares commove with relative quantities. Indeed, the correlation between the
two series is 75 percent. This suggests that ε is greater than one.
Another important empirical property of the expenditure share is that even if relative prices
and quantities are trending, αt itself does not trend over time. At the same time, real income per
capita has increased dramatically over our sample period. This suggests that the expenditure share







real rents ln q
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Figure 2: Real rents and relative quantity of housing services, annual data 1929-2001.
does not go up with real income, which means that our homogeneity assumption on preferences
does not seem to be at odds with the data. The absence of trends in expenditure shares is also an
advantage for econometric work.
The non-housing expenditure share is highly persistent but stationary. Its autocorrelation is
0.965, so that low variations in αt translate into the low frequency movements that we see in Figure
1. The low frequency is speciﬁc to housing and does not obtain for just any good. These empirical
properties of αt imply that composition risk introduces predictable variations in the pricing kernel
(9). This property is crucial for our asset pricing results.
Microevidence on Expenditure Shares
To investigate the properties of expenditure shares at the microlevel, we use data from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). In the Appendix, we document that the CEX evidence is
remarkably consistent with the aggregate evidence. The expenditure shares on shelter are similar
across diﬀerent groups of households. These groups are classiﬁed by income quintile, region of
19residence, age of the person who rents or owns the house, race, number of persons in the household,
housing tenure, and education. For each group, the CEX evidence also suggests that expenditure
shares are not volatile over time. This microevidence conﬁrms that the behavior of the aggregate
expenditure share is not an artifact of aggregation.
Subsamples
Throughout this paper, we report results for the post-war period as well as for the post-
depression period. Figure 1 shows that the behavior of the expenditure share was qualitatively
similar during the two periods. In particular, αt is persistent and positively correlated with the
dividend yield on stocks. It is also heteroskedastic: when it is high, it tends to be subject to larger
shocks. The sample starting in 1936, rather than in 1947, is informed by particularly large varia-
tion in expenditure. This volatility probably shaped agents’ perception of composition risk, which
makes the post-1936 sample interesting. We also consider the post-war sample to provide a lower
bound on the contribution of composition risk.
We do not include the Great Depression in our sample. The reason is that the expenditure
share behaved qualitatively very diﬀerently during the depression than at any time since then: it
fell and then rebounded together with the stock market, and the rebound made it experience a
large (positive) shock at a time when it was small. In a post-1929 sample, two of the depression
years thus act as large outliers that dominate any empirical averages. This result shows that the
Great Depression was accompanied by a shock to housing and stock markets unlike any shock seen
since then.
Since we want to apply the standard methodology of calibrating a stationary model to empirical
moments, we thus have two options. First, we can specify a data-generating process for the post-
1929 sample. This process would have to allow for signs of correlations to ﬂip and conditional
variances to change over time in a way to accommodate the special movements of the depression.
The problem with this approach is that, since there is only one depression, and only one exit from
a depression, many parameters of this process would necessarily be poorly estimated. This poorly
estimated process would nevertheless have to be imposed on agents in the model as guiding their
expectation formation.
20Second, we can leave out the depression from our sample, and specify a data-generating process
for the post-1936 period, where the behavior of the key series is qualitatively consistent across
subsamples. In eﬀect, we would assume that agents treat the Great Depression as a unique shock,
and that the New Deal marks a break in the behavior of U.S. housing and stock markets. In light
of the institutional changes introduced in the early 1930s (for example, in the mortgage market),
this second option strikes us as more sensible. We thus assume that the agents in our model are
like us and consider the Great Depression as caused by a unique shock.
B. Data on Non-housing Consumption
To measure non-housing consumption ct, we use aggregate consumption of nondurables and services
from NIPA Table 7.4. We follow the convention of excluding shoes and clothing, because they may
be viewed as durable (see, for example, Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001). However, we exclude housing
services. Table 1 presents summary statistics of our non-housing consumption series: it grows at
an average rate of 2.2 percent and its standard deviation is 1.9 percent per year. For comparison,
the penultimate column of Table 1 also reports the corresponding numbers for the conventional
consumption growth measure (which includes housing), which are similar. To deﬂate returns,
we also construct the price index pc
t that exactly corresponds to our deﬁnition of non-housing
consumption from the NIPA tables. (Details are available upon request.)
For completeness, we also report statistics on the NIPA quantity index on housing services in
the last column of Table 1. Again, we want to stress that we do not use this series, because of
the quality-judgments and other problems involved in constructing this quantity index. Having
said that, several properties of the series are noteworthy. First, the growth rate of NIPA housing
consumption Δlnst is highly persistent – its autocorrelation is .74 and even goes up to .77 during
the postwar sample. The growth rate of non-housing consumption Δlnct is much less persistent; its
autocorrelation over the two samples is .23 and .40, respectively. Second, both growth rates, Δlnct
and Δlnst, are not volatile. Their standard deviations are both around 2 percent and somewhat
lower in the postwar sample.
21Table 1. Summary Statistics Of Historical Data
Data Series for Calibration and Model Evaluation
. . . Other NIPA Series





. . .Δ l n Ct Δlnst
mean (%) 2.17 82.6 .01 156.0 6.94 2.52 .75 1.48
. . . 2.25 3.85
autocorr. .23 .965 .56 .964 -.06 .48 .73 .34
. . .. 2 4 . 7 4
Post-war sample
mean (%) 1.85 82.3 -.09 153.6 7.80 2.09 1.57 1.79
. . . 1.98 3.91
autocorr. .40 .84 .64 .83 .02 .44 .52 .58
. . .. 4 1 . 7 7





Δlnαt .54 .14 .50
. . .
lnzt .03 1.00 .14 11.43
. . .
rs
t .04 -.02 -.17 -.03 16.56
. . .
rh
t .53 .10 .08 .10 .01 2.73
. . .
rf .02 -.71 -.42 -.70 .20 .02 3.68
. . .
Δlndt .24 .05 -.15 .05 -.02 .28 .16 8.28
. . .
...... ..................................................................
ΔlnCt .98 .07 .51 .07 .004 .53 -.05 .24
. . .1 . 5 8
Δlnst -.10 .49 -.21 .41 -.19 -.09 -.48 .04
. . . .04 1.72





Δlnαt .34 -.43 .36
. . .
lnzt -.46 1.00 -.43 9.39
. . .
rs
t .15 .02 -.24 .01 15.36
. . .
rh




t .42 -.63 .03 -.64 .14 -.04 2.86
. . .
Δlndt .06 .30 -.32 .31 .20 .16 -.02 5.26
. . .
...... ..................................................................
ΔlnCt .98 -.40 .28 -.41 .10 .48 .33 .08
. . .1 . 2 3
Δlnst -.17 .49 -.46 -.48 .50 -.02 -.58 .24
. . . .01 1.67
22Note: The summary statistics are computed over the post-depression sample 1936-2001 and
over the post-war sample 1947-2001. The data on housing returns are only available until 2000.
The middle columns report statistics of NIPA series and returns that are used to calibrate
and evaluate the model, while the last two columns consider additional NIPA series. The
diagonal numbers are standard deviations, while the numbers below are correlations. Non-
housing consumption data Δlnct is nondurables and services from lines 6 and 13 from NIPA
Tables 2.2 and 7.4, minus shoes and clothing (line 8) and housing services (line 14). The non-
housing consumption expenditure share αt deﬁned in (8) is based on housing expenditures (line
14). The expenditure ratio zt is deﬁned in (7). Log real stock returns rs
t,t h el o gr e a lr a t er
f
t
and dividend growth Δlndt are from Robert Shiller’s website. Log real housing returns rh
t are
constructed as in equation (21) from NIPA Fixed Asset Tables 2.1, line 68. To deﬂate returns,
we construct our own price index corresponding to our deﬁnition of ct from NIPA Tables 2.2
and 7.4. The growth rate of the bundle ΔlnCt stands for the standard CCAPM measure of
consumption growth which includes housing services. The growth rate of housing services Δlnst
is measured using the NIPA quantity index in Table 7.4 line 14.
C. Financial data
To compare the implications of our model to ﬁnancial data, we use data on nominal stock prices
and corresponding dividends, and the nominal riskfree rate from Robert Shiller’s website. Table
1 reports summary statistics for returns, which are deﬂated with our new inﬂation rate for only
non-housing consumption. Still, the summary statistics for these real returns look familiar. The
real returns on stocks have a high mean, 6.9-7.8 percent, and a high volatility, 15.4-16.6 percent.
By contrast, the riskfree rate has a low mean, 0.8-1.6 percent, and a low volatility, 2.9-3.7 percent.
To measure returns on housing, we compute returns from the NIPA Fixed Asset Tables, which
contain the value of the aggregate housing stock. The Appendix compares our return deﬁnition
with several alternatives (such as the OFHEO house price index and the National Association of
Realtors index), which give similar results. Table 1 shows that the mean real returns on housing
are 2.1-2.5 percent, closer in value to the mean riskfree rate than to mean stock returns. The real
returns on housing have a low volatility, 2.3-2.7 percent, comparable to the volatility of the riskfree
rate. Of course, these numbers can only provide a rough indication, since aggregate house-price
indices are smoothed.
23V Equilibrium Prices
We now consider asset pricing in an economy where housing and numeraire consumption shocks
are the only sources of uncertainty. We calibrate the model based on a VAR for the growth rate
and the expenditure share of non-housing consumption. We then compute asset prices for a range
of preference parameters.
A. Calibration
As a forcing process, we take the vector (Δlnct,lnzt), where zt =( pc
tct)/(ps
tst) is the expendi-
ture ratio deﬁned in (7). We assume that (Δlnct,lnzt) follows a stationary bivariate VAR with
conditionally normal errors. The stationarity of lnzt implies that log expenditures on consumption
and housing are cointegrated. The intratemporal FOC (6) implies that the same is true for relative
quantities and relative prices. We impose restrictions on the VAR to capture three key properties
of the data: (i) consumption growth is not forecastable, (ii) the log-expenditure ratio is persistent
and past consumption growth does not help forecast it, and (iii) shocks to consumption growth
are homoskedastic, while shocks to the log-expenditure ratio are heteroskedastic.
Dynamics of consumption growth and expenditure shares
We assume that consumption growth is i.i.d.,
(13) Δlnct+1 = μc + uc
t+1,
where the consumption growth shock uc
t+1 has mean zero and variance vc. While the Table 1
shows some positive autocorrelation in the data, Heaton (1993) and others have argued that this
autocorrelation may be entirely due to time aggregation. We therefore assume that expected
consumption growth μc is constant. We also assume that the variance of consumption growth vc is
constant. We set these parameters equal to their sample values from Table 1.
A regression of lnzt+1 on its lagged value and Δlnct shows that consumption growth is barely













Figure 3: Empirical density of the log expenditure ratio lnz (black line) and simulated density
(gray line).
signiﬁcant. We therefore specify the log expenditure ratio as the autoregressive process
(14) lnzt+1 =( 1− ρ)μz + ρlnzt + uz
t+1,
where uz
t+1 has mean zero and conditional variance vz,t. The shocks uc
t+1 and uz
t+1 are conditionally
normal. Their correlation is negative in the data, which turns out to have negligible eﬀects on our
results. For parsimony, we therefore set the correlation to zero.
The shocks uz
t to the log expenditure ratio show substantial heteroskedasticity – their variance
increases with lnzt. We specify the conditional variance as
(15) vz,t = a1 max{lnzt,z}−a0.
The conditional variance is thus linear in lnzt except for small lnzt, where it is constant.
25Table 2 reports parameter estimates and t-statistics for the VAR. The estimation is in two
steps. The ﬁrst step estimates μz and ρ in equation (14) using ordinary least squares and saves
the squared residuals. The second step regresses squared residuals on a constant and lnzt−1 to
estimate a0 and a1. T h ep r e c i s ev a l u eo fz does not matter much in our application; we ﬁx it to
match the unconditional variance of lnz. Figure 3 shows the empirical and simulated densities of
the estimated process for lnz. The black empirical density is skewed to the left, and this skewness
is well captured by the grey density of the simulated data-generating process.
Table 2. Estimates Of Expenditure Ratio Dynamics
μz ρa 0 a1 z
1.56 0.96 −0.0117 0.0081 1.47




Note: The parameters are estimated in two steps, as explained in the text. T-statistics
in brackets are based on 4 Newey-West lags.
Table 2 shows that the heteroskedasticity of lnzt is signiﬁcant. In particular, the estimate of
a1 is signiﬁcantly positive, as expected. The estimated process captures the heteroskedasticity
in the data well. Intuitively, shocks to lnzt are larger in times when the expenditure ratio is
high. We can use the FOC (6) to interpret this feature in terms of quantities. If housing and
non-housing consumption are substitutes (ε>1), times with relatively little housing correspond
to times when the volatility of shocks is higher. In other words, times with little housing are times
when uncertainty increases.
Long-Lived Assets
To price equity, we specify dividends as
(16) Δlndt+1 = kΔlnct+1 + ud
t+1,
where k is a constant and ud
t+1 is i.i.d. normal with mean zero and variance vd, independent of
26all other shocks. Our results are based on k = 1 and a variance vd that matches the variance of
dividend growth. The advantage of this speciﬁcation is that we can allow dividend growth to be
more volatile than consumption growth, and we can also allow for imperfect correlation between
consumption growth and dividend growth. From Table 1, we get vd =8 .282 − 1.882 percent for
the long sample, vd =5 .262 − 1.462 percent for the postwar sample. For the long sample, this
approach matches the empirical correlation between consumption and dividend growth exactly,
while it somewhat overstates the correlation in the postwar sample. Below we will discuss the
implications of alternative speciﬁcations.
A diﬀerence equation for the price-dividend ratio is obtained by plugging the discount factor (9)
into the pricing equation. For housing, we calculate an analogous price-dividend ratio by equating
the value of the housing stock with the present discounted value of all future housing services,
























Conveniently, the solution υs
t reduces to the price of a consol bond if k =0a n dvd =0 .
The dividend processes of allthe assets we wantto price can be written as functions of the forcing
process (Δlnct+1,lnzt) plus i.i.d. shocks. Given parameters ε and σ and the estimated distribution
of the forcing process, we determine asset prices as stationary solutions to the stochastic diﬀerence
equation (17). Although we have not speciﬁed an exogenous endowment process explicitly, the
resulting prices are equilibrium prices for an economy summarized by a tuple {β,σ,ε,ω,(¯ ct, ¯ st)},
as in Section III. Indeed, the intratemporal FOC must hold in any equilibrium of such an economy.
We can thus deﬁne a jointly stationary and Markov process (Δlnct,ln(ct/st)) by (6), for some
positive scalar ω.5 An endowment process (¯ ct, ¯ st) can then be constructed by ﬁxing a time zero
level of consumption c0.
5Our approach does not identify the parameter ω. This is not necessary, since the pricing kernel implies that when
expenditure data is available, there is no need to know ω in order to fully characterize the asset pricing implications of
the model. Of course, this does not mean that ω does not matter for asset pricing. For example, if ω is equal to zero,
housing is not valued, and we are back in the one-good case. The point is that expenditure shares already contain
the information about ω that is needed. For example, any nonzero amount of expenditures on housing implies that
the value of ω cannot be zero.
27The pricing kernel for the economy just deﬁned takes the form (9), and its distribution is
by construction the same as that of the expenditure-share-based kernel we use in our empirical
work. Dividends on our assets can also be expressed in terms of (Δln¯ ct+1,ln(¯ ct/¯ st)) by (6).
Moreover the Markov structure implies that their price-dividend ratios at time t depend only on
(Δlnct,ln(ct/st)), as well as on the parameters (β,σ,ε,ω) that enter the pricing kernel (9). In other
words, the price-dividend ratios in the constructed economy follow the same stochastic diﬀerence
equation (17) that we use to compute prices below.
Preference Parameters
For the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, we follow Hall (1988) who estimates σ to be
around 0.2. Studies based on micro data ﬁnd values for σ that are somewhat higher, but not
by much. For example, Runkle (1991) reports an estimate of 0.45 using micro data on food
consumption. Attanasio and Browning (1995) report estimates using CEX data between [0.48,0.67].
We will refer to σ =0 .2a so u rlo risk aversion benchmark and then consider higher values.
Estimates of the intratemporal elasticity are more diﬃcult to obtain. The problems with data
quality in Section IV imply that direct estimation of the intratemporal FOC (6) is problematic. We
therefore report results for a range of ε values. We focus only on values of ε greater than 1. This
choice is based on two pieces of evidence. First, this range is suggested by the existing empirical
literature. Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) estimate ε with aggregate data on durable consumption.
Their Table 2 on page 1091 gives [1.04,1.43] as a 95 percent conﬁdence interval for ε.T h et e s tf o r
unitary elasticity ε = 1 is thus rejected. Papers in the home-production literature also estimate ε
to be above one. Benhabib et al. (1991) obtain ε =2 .5 and McGrattan et al. (1997) get 1.75.
Second, we estimate the cointegrating relationship implied by the intratemporal FOC (6) be-
tween NIPA quantity and price data for housing services. The idea is that even if these data are
mismeasured, they may still provide useful information about long-run trends. The Appendix re-
ports the results of this exercise. The key parameter in the cointegrating relationship is ε, which
we estimate to be 1.27 with a standard error of 0.16. We also estimate ε based on Euler equations
for excess returns in Subsection F. We obtain ε =1 .17 and ε =1 .24, but these come with huge
standard errors. These pieces of evidence suggest that ε is above one.
28B. Numerical Results
Panel A of Table 3 reviews properties of the standard CCAPM. We report ﬁrst and second moments
of annual equity premia, consol premia, and the riskless rate, all in logarithms. We consider two
parameterizations, which will be compared to two benchmark versions of the housing model below.
In the case of lo risk aversion, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is 1/σ = 5, and the discount
factor is β = .99. For the hi risk aversion case, we set the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion to
1/σ = 16, and we also make the agent more patient β =1 .24. The two cases imply roughly the
same equity premium and riskfree rate.
As is standard in the literature, aggregate consumption growth and dividend growth are i.i.d.
lognormal processes of the forms (13) and (16) with k = 1. Therefore, the riskfree rate and the
price-dividend ratio are constant. Moreover, expected excess returns are constant and therefore
not predictable. Panel A of Table 3 also illustrates other familiar problems with the CCAPM. The
CCAPM predicts a high riskfree rate of almost 12 percent – the riskfree rate puzzle – as well as
an equity premium of less than 60 basis points, or 0.6 percent – the equity premium puzzle. In
addition, the volatility of stock returns in the model is too small; this is the volatility puzzle. For
example, σ (ers)=
 
k2 × vc + vd is 1.6 percent when we assume that dividends equal consumption
as in Mehra and Prescott (1985), so that k =1a n dvd = 0. In Table 3, the volatility of stock
returns is higher than that, 8.2 percent, because we allow for orthogonal shocks to dividend growth,
vd  =0 .
Panel B of Table 3 reports the same ﬁnancial moments for the model with housing, together with
ﬁrst and second moments of annual housing returns. We compute the model for candidate values
of the intratemporal substitution ε above one. In particular, Panel B emphasizes two benchmark
cases in bold-face. In the ﬁrst benchmark case, hi perceived risk, the elasticity of intratemporal
substitution ε is set close to the Cobb-Douglas case. Equation (10) shows that true aggregate
consumption - the quantity index implied by preferences - becomes more volatile as ε goes to one.
We combine ε =1 .05 with lo risk aversion (1/σ =5a n dβ =0 .99). The second benchmark case
has hi risk aversion (1/σ =1 6a n dβ =1 .24) as well as an intertemporal elasticity of substitution
ε =1 .25 that is close to the point estimate (ε =1 .27) from Appendix C.
29Table 3. Model-Implied Moments Of Returns (%)
Panel A. Standard CCAPM


















5 0.99 11.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 8.2 0.0
16 1.24 11.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 8.2 0.0
Panel B. Housing-CCAPM


















Homoskedastic Shocks: vz,t = constant
5 0.99 1.05 2.2 6.5 5.7 7.6 5.0 18.9 14.9 19.9
16 1.24 1.25 2.2 5.3 4.5 6.3 4.1 17.9 14.0 18.5
Heteroskedastic Shocks: vz,t = a1 max{lnzt, ¯ z}−a0
5 0.99 1.25 11.1 1.0 0.3 0.8 0.7 8.6 2.0 5.0
1.10 9.0 1.4 0.8 1.5 0.9 9.1 3.4 6.8
1.05 1.8 3.5 2.5 3.7 0.9 11.4 5.9 10.1
1.04 −2.3 6.0 4.4 5.6 1.8 14.9 9.1 13.6
3 1.05 5.2 1.8 1.1 1.6 0.9 10.4 5.3 9.0
4 4.2 2.5 1.7 2.7 0.6 10.7 5.5 9.7
6 −1.9 5.7 4.1 5.6 2.2 13.8 4.1 12.5
7 −4.1 9.8 5.1 6.2 3.7 18.8 10.1 13.8
16 0.99 1.25 25.5 1.1 0.1 2.4 0.5 8.4 0.1 4.5
1.24 1.25 1.8 3.5 2.5 3.9 0.5 11.9 6.6 10.5
Post-war Results
5 0.99 1.05 7.5 3.0 2.7 3.1 7.5 17.0 15.2 16.7
1.05 1.0 3.7 3.2 3.8 7.5 21.4 19.4 20.9
16 1.24 1.25 2.9 2.9 2.4 3.1 6.4 17.3 15.6 16.8
1.26 1.8 3.1 2.4 3.1 6.4 18.1 16.4 17.6
Panel C. Properties of Aggregate Bundle for different ε
Long Sample Post-war Sample
For ε-value: 1.04 1.05 1.10 1.25 1.04 1.05 1.10 1.25
μ(ΔlnC) 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 4.4 3.9 3.0 2.4
ρ(ΔlnC) .59 .60 .62 .56 .62 .62 .62 .56
σ(ΔlnC) 12.0 9.5 4.7 2.2 9.0 7.2 3.7 1.8
30The two benchmark cases in Panel B deliver exactly the same mean riskfree rate and equity
premium. The model generates a low and smooth riskfree rate with a mean of 1.8 percent and a
volatility of 0.9 percent. The equity premium is high and excess stock returns are volatile; their
mean is 3.5 percent and their volatility above 11.4 percent. In contrast, the consol premium in the
model is smaller and smoother. Its mean is 2.5 percent and its volatility is below 6.6 percent. The
model also does a reasonable job on housing returns in both cases. The mean housing premium is
roughly 3.7 percent with a volatility of roughly 10.1 percent.
Panel C reports properties of model-implied aggregate consumption. With hi perceived risk,t h e
volatilityof the aggregatebundle in equation (10) is 9.5 percent in the long sample. The aggregation
method used by NIPA produces an aggregate bundle with lower volatilityof 1.6 percent (from Table
1). The higher volatility perceived by agents in our model is partly due to autocorrelation: the
agent perceives the bundle to have a ﬁrst autocorrelation of 60 percent, while NIPA aggregation
methods result in a bundle that with only 23 percent autocorrelation. Panel C also shows that
with hi risk aversion, the true consumption bundle behaves more like the NIPA bundle.
Figure 4 plots asset prices as a function of the single state variable, the log expenditure ratio
lnzt. The ﬁgure – and all other ﬁgures in this paper – is based on hi perceived risk and equation
(16) with k = 1 and a volatility vd of orthogonal dividend shocks that matches the volatility of
dividend growth. All prices of long-lived assets are decreasing in lnzt, with stock prices showing
the most sensitivity.6 The model thus correctly predicts the positive comovement of αt and the
dividend-yield on stocks in Figure 2. Importantly, the movements in the stock price are not due
to changes in expected dividend growth, because consumption growth is i.i.d.. As a result, stock
price movements are mostly driven by news about future discount rates, captured by αt,r a t h e r
than news about future dividends. This means that composition risk generates the “right type” of
volatility, in line with the empirical ﬁndings of Cochrane (1994).
Decreasing the elasticities of substitution ε and σ increases the impact of composition risk.
Table 3 illustrates both cases. As ε goes to one, the equity premium increases, the average riskless
rate decreases, and all asset prices become more volatile. A lower σ has a similar eﬀect on premia
6Kinks in the price function for low values of lnzt occur since the conditional variances of the innovations become
constant as lnzt drops below ¯ z. The results are not sensitive to the choice of ¯ z.
















































Figure 4: Asset Prices as a Function of lnzt.
and asset-price volatility, since it also increases the exponent (ε − σ)/σ(ε − 1) in the pricing kernel
(9). However, the parameter σ leaves the properties of the aggregate bundle and its price index
unchanged. Lowering σ thus has the standard eﬀect of increasing the riskless rate since agents
who like to substitute consumption push up the riskless rate in a growing economy. To keep the
riskfree rate low, we need to make the agent more patient. This can be accomplished with a higher
discount factor β.
C. Volatility and Premia
Our numerical results are based on the nonlinear pricing kernel (9). To gain intuition about the
unconditional moments reported in Table 3, it is helpful to linearly approximate the log kernel.
We write Mt+1 = βe−(1/σ)Δ lnct+1+[(ε−σ)/σ(ε−1)]Δlnαt+1 and linearize Δlnαt+1 around the point
32zt+1 = zt.W et h u so b t a i n 7












Conditional normality of (Δlnct,lnzt) and the approximation (18) also lead to a convenient
formula for the riskless interest rate:
r
f





















The eﬀect of consumption risk on the riskfree rate is familiar and is captured by the ﬁrst line
of the equation. If consumption is expected to grow, agents try to borrow, pushing the interest
rate up. If consumption growth becomes more uncertain, agents try to engage in precautionary
saving, pushing the interest rate down. Both eﬀects are stronger the more agents want to smooth
consumption (low σ). Since consumption is not very volatile, the precautionary savings eﬀect is
small for reasonable values of σ; this is the riskfree rate puzzle. Also, consumption risk does not
lead to time variation in interest rates, because consumption growth is not forecastable and its
variance is constant over time.
The eﬀect of composition risk on the interest rate is represented by the expression in braces. The
presence of composition risk implies that the riskfree rate is loweron average. This is because agents
worry about composition risk and therefore attempt to save more on average. Formally, suppose
the expenditure ratio lnzt is equal to its unconditional mean μz. The ﬁrst term in braces then
collapses to zero, while the second term is negative, since αt is always smaller than 1. Precautionary
savings induced by the volatility vz,t of shocks to the expenditure ratio thus pushes the riskfree
rate down. Therefore, composition risk helps resolve the riskfree rate puzzle.
7The approximation is not exact. In particular, it masks the fact that in the nonlinear kernel, correlation with
consumption growth will be also be weighted diﬀerently as αt changes. This eﬀect will be made explicit by picking
a diﬀerent linearization point. For example, one could assume an AR(1) process for lnzt and linearize around the
conditional mean. The current approximation is simpler and is suﬃcient to interpret the computational results, which
are based on the true nonlinear kernel.
33Composition risk also leads to variation in the riskless rate. There are two eﬀects at work. First,
there is a new intertemporal substitution eﬀect: agents try to borrow in severe recessions, when
the expenditure ratio lnzt is high and housing consumption is relatively low. In severe recessions,
agents correctly expect that better times are ahead, because the expenditure ratio will revert to
its mean. In equation (19), the intertemporal substitution eﬀect is captured by the ﬁrst term in
braces: the interest rate increases when lnzt is higher than its unconditional mean μz.
A second eﬀect is that the strength of the precautionary savings motive varies over time with
the amount of composition risk. Agents worry more about composition risk in severe recessions,
when shocks to the expenditure ratio are larger. Indeed, by (15), an increase in lnzt goes along
with an increase in the conditional variance vz,t and thereby increases the second term in braces.
As a result, agents try to save more in severe recessions and push the interest rate down. The
precautionary savings eﬀect thus counteracts the intertemporal substitution eﬀect and reduces the
volatility of the riskless rate.8
At the same time, heteroskedasticity does not fully neutralize the intertemporal substitution
eﬀect. This is because the impact of heteroskedasticity is diminished as the non-housing share rises:
the second term is multiplied by (1− αt). Indeed, as αt → 1, the precautionary savings eﬀect will
vanish faster than the intertemporal substitution eﬀect. This implies that the interest rate for high
αt will be higher than its mean. At least for high αt, we can thus expect an interest rate function
that is increasing in αt. Figure 3 and Figure 4 conﬁrm the intuition that the riskless rate is very
stable in the part of state space which has highest probability. Indeed, it is non-monotonic in this
area, as a result of the counteracting precautionary savings and intertemporal smoothing eﬀects.
Risk Premia






























8As mentioned in Section II, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) also rely on heteroskedasticity. Their estimates of
the heteroskedasticity parameters are, however, based on moments of asset prices – the volatility of the riskfree rate.
Our estimates from Table 2 are only based on macroeconomic data.
34The risk premium on any asset depends on the conditional covariance of its return with two fac-
tors, non-housing consumption growth and the change in the expenditure ratio. The conditional
covariance of returns and non-housing consumption growth is small. However, Figure 4 has shown
that the prices of long-lived assets such as stocks and consols move opposite to the composition
risk factor lnzt, so that returns are negatively correlated with Δlnzt. In light of the second term
on the right hand side of (20), this is exactly what is needed to generate additional premia due to
composition risk. In addition, leverage and growth in dividends implies that stock prices are more
volatile than consol prices. As a result, the equity premium is larger and more volatile than the
consol premium.
The model also implies that expected excess returns vary over time. This is illustrated in Figure
5, which plots the model-implied dividend yield and expected returns over the post-war period. It
is apparent that the dividend yield is a slow-moving state variable which forecasts returns. This
is consistent with recent empirical evidence, which we compare more closely with the model’s
implications in Subsection D. Moreover, the model predicts that αt, which is highly correlated with
the dividend yield, should also be a good forecasting variable. This is indeed the case in the data,
as documented in Subsection E.
Price Volatility of Long–Lived Assets
To understand the role of discount rate news for prices, it is useful to ﬁrst abstract from
heteroskedasticity. We can then use (18) to deﬁne a state-dependent discount rate δt+1 = −lnMt+1
















































j (k) is the present discounted value, adjusted for consumption risk and normalized by current































Figure 5: Model-implied expected excess returns and dividend yield.
dividends, of a claim to dividends in period t + j. In other words, it is the price of such a claim in
the standard CCAPM divided by current dividends. With i.i.d. consumption, this ratio is constant,
which amounts to a version of the volatility puzzle. In our Housing CCAPM, volatility is induced
by the new discount factor for composition risk wj (lnzt). Innovations to lnzt provide news about
current and future discount rates δt+j. In line with the empirical ﬁndings of Cochrane (1994), it is
this type of news, not news about dividends, that accounts for most changes in prices.
The formula also clariﬁes the relationship between stock and consol prices. On the one hand,
as long as υ∗
j is increasing in k, the price-dividend ratio is larger and more volatile than the consol
price. The random factor wj (lnzt) aﬀects consols and stocks in the same way; diﬀerences across
assets exist only to the extent that there are diﬀerences in υ∗
j (k). The latter is increasing if
μc > 1
2 (1/σ − k)vc + 1
2vd/(1/σ − k). An increase in k increases both mean growth and dividend
risk. If risk aversion and consumption risk are not too high, the mean eﬀect dominates and the
price-dividend ratio goes up. On the other hand, mean reversion in the non-housing ratio lnzt
implies that both prices move opposite to lnzt. Unfortunately, the discount factor wj (lnzt)i s
36not available in closed form, since zt itself is a nonlinear function of αt. However, numerical
results for the homoskedastic case (not shown) deliver a shape much like Figure 4. If lnzt is large,
then Δlnzt+1 is negative with high probability, that is, housing is expected to grow faster than
expenditure on numeraire. This makes saving in numeraire terms relatively less attractive and
hence lowers asset prices.
With heteroskedasticity, bad times are associated with more composition risk. This is captured
by the fact that vz,t goes up with lnzt, which has two eﬀects. First, it dampens the response of
prices to a unit change in the log expenditure ratio lnzt. The reason is that an increase in risk
encourages precautionary savings, so that agents discount the future less. Therefore, prices fall by
less than in the homoskedastic case. Second, the size of the typical shock is larger when lnzt is
high. This tends to increase the conditional volatility of returns when lnzt is high. On net, the
variance of returns and their associated premia thus tend to be higher in the heteroskedastic case.
Figure 4 also shows that our measure of the value-rent ratiofor the housing stock varies responds
much less to a change in zt than the price-dividend ratio. The reason is that, while an increase
in lnzt increases discount rates, it also increases the expected growth rate of housing dividends,
Δlnct+1 − Δlnzt+1. Since the non-housing ratio reverts to its mean, a high value today predicts
an increase in housing expenditure in the future. This increases the current value of the housing
stock, partly oﬀsetting the increase in discount rates. In our model, houses are thus less risky than
stocks and command a lower premium.9 The price dynamics also suggests the share of housing










as another candidate variable for
forecasting returns. We do not pursue this implication in the current paper, since it would require
data on wealth.
Post-war Performance
To see how the model behaves over the post-war sample, we report results for the two benchmark
parameterizations in the last four rows of Panel B in Table 3. Composition risk still leads to
9Housing returns computed from the model according to equation (17) not only measure the returns on one unit
of housing, but also include the value of new housing. Housing returns computed for Table 1 do not include the value
of new housing. When we do include the value of new housing, mean returns go up by 2.5 percentage points. The
standard deviation of housing returns is unchanged.
37substantial average excess returns on stocks. The model also still generates high volatility of stock
returns. However, a larger portion of these eﬀects is now simply attributable to a term premium
– compensation for holding a long maturity asset – as opposed to an equity premium. The reason
is that the model generates more volatility in the riskfree rate when we calibrate to post-war data,
and term premia increase to compensate for this higher volatility.
To understand the increase in σ
 
rf 
, consider the parameter estimates in Table 2. Over the
long sample, the estimates show substantial time variation in the volatility of the expenditure share
αt. In particular, the volatility of αt increases during bad times, when the expenditure share αt is
high. This higher risk generates a motive for precautionary savings, which pushes down the riskfree
rate. In the shorter post-war sample, there is still evidence of heteroskedasticity in the expenditure
share αt. Table 2 shows that the parameter a1, which governs the dependence of the conditional
variance on lnzt, is still estimated to be signiﬁcant. The point estimate of a1, however, is much
smaller than the long-sample estimate. When we calibrate the model to post-war data, agents thus
have less reason to save in bad times, which increases the risk-free rate during bad times relative




7 percent in Panel B.
Another, less important, diﬀerence between the model implications over the two samples is that
the mean of the riskfree rate is lower over the long sample. The reason is that there have been large
shocks to the expenditure share in the ﬁrst half of this century, which increase our point estimate
of the unconditional volatility of the expenditure share relative to the post-war experience. This
higher average composition risk leads to more precautionary savings, and thus a lower risk-free
rate on average. Comparing our benchmark results in Panel B to the post-war results reveals the
eﬀect of this decrease in unconditional volatility on E
 
rf 
. This eﬀect can easily be counteracted,
however, by increasing the discount factor β to values above one. The results with hi perceived risk
show that the model still generates a low average short rate for β =1 .05, while the same is true
for β =1 .26 with hi risk aversion.
Alternative Dividend Speciﬁcations
To investigate how the speciﬁcation of dividends in equation (16) aﬀects our results, we consider
38the following three cases:
a. dividends are equal to consumption plus i.i.d. shocks, k =1a n dvd > 0. The parameter vd
is picked to match the volatility of dividend growth.
b. dividends are equal to consumption, k =1a n dvd =0 .
c. dividends are equal to a levered up version of consumption, k>1a n dvd = 0. The constant
k is picked to match the volatility of dividend growth.
The results in all our tables are based on case a, which is arguably the most realistic speciﬁcation,
since it captures both the relative volatility and the correlation between consumption growth and
dividend growth. We now report some results for Cases b and c because they frequently appear in
the literature. Case b is the speciﬁcation of Mehra and Prescott (1985). Case c, due to Campbell
(1986) and Abel (1989), captures the fact that dividend growth is more volatile than consumption
growth, but assumes that the two are perfectly correlated. At our parameter values, Table 1 implies
that k =8 .28/1.88 = 4.4 for the long sample and k =5 .26/1.46 = 3.6 for the postwar sample.
We ﬁnd that the speciﬁcation of dividends matters for the size of the equity premium and the
volatility of equity returns implied by the model. Speciﬁcally, cases a and b imply roughly the
same equity premium – the short rate is unaﬀected by the speciﬁcation of dividends and average
stock returns in c. are only slightly lower.10 However, equity premia in case c are more than twice
as large as the numbers reported in Table 3. Intuitively, the agent does not worry about shocks to
dividends ud that are orthogonal to consumption: since these shocks do not represent systematic
risk, they do not increase the equity premium. The amount of systematic risk in dividend growth is
roughly the same in cases a and b, because k = 1 in both speciﬁcations. In contrast, the amount of
systematic risk in case b is much higher, because the entire volatility of dividend growth is due to
shocks that are perfectly correlated with consumption growth, and so the equity premium is higher.
Of course, any shocks to dividend growth – whether systematic or not - increase the volatility of
stock returns, and so the volatility of stock returns in cases a and c is much higher than in case b.
10To see why, it is useful to consider a solution υ
s
t+1 to the diﬀerence equation (17) without dividend shocks, vd =0 .
The price-dividend ratio with shocks, vd  = 0, is larger, because it solves the same equation, but with a higher discount




t) is lower and thus average stock returns are
lower. However, the diﬀerence between cases a. and b. is small – always lower than 30 basis points, or .3 percentage
points, for the models considered in the various rows of Table 3.
39D. Predicting Excess Returns with the Dividend-Yield
The model implies that excess returns are predictable. In particular, excess returns on stocks are
predictable by the dividend yield. This can be read oﬀ Figure 4, which shows that the dividend
yield is a function of the stationary variable lnzt. The dividend yield inherits the persistence and
mean reversion from lnzt. If the dividend yield is high, it predicts a lower dividend yield and
thus higher price-dividend ratio in the future. Together with i.i.d. dividend growth and a smooth
riskfree rate, a high dividend yield therefore predicts high excess returns. Intuitively, expected
excess returns are higher in severe recessions (times when lnzt is high), because investors demand
higher compensation for composition risk in those times.
Table 4. Predicting Excess Returns With The Dividend-Yield
Horizon Model Long Sample Post-war Sample
hi perceived risk hi risk aversion
(years) slope R2 slope R2 slope t-stat R2 slope t-stat R2
1 0.15 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.11 2.51 0.07 0.11 2.25 0.08
2 0.29 0.09 0.27 0.10 0.21 2.15 0.12 0.21 1.95 0.12
3 0.41 0.13 0.39 0.15 0.24 1.70 0.11 0.24 1.53 0.11
4 0.51 0.16 0.50 0.18 0.32 1.63 0.13 0.32 1.41 0.11
5 0.60 0.19 0.59 0.21 0.49 2.49 0.19 0.52 2.26 0.17






constant and the log dividend yield ln1/vs
t for n =1,...,5years. The“Model”columns
contain the average slope and R2 over 50,000 simulated samples with 65 observations.
The model with hi perceived risk is the bold-face parameterization in Table 3 with ε
= 1.05, β = 0.99, and 1/σ = 5. The model with hi risk aversion is the bold-face
parameterization in Table 3 with ε = 1.25, β = 1.24, and 1/σ = 16. The “Long
Sample” columns run regressions with historical 1936-2001 data, and the “Post-war
Sample” columns use 1947-2001 data. T-statistics are based on Newey-West standard
errors to correct for overlapping observations.
To see how much predictability the model generates, we simulate 50,000 sample paths at the
two sets of benchmark preference parameters. For each simulated path, we regress excess returns
on a constant and the dividend yield. We also run the same regression with historical data. The
”Model” columns in Table 4 report average slope coeﬃcients and average R2 based on the simulated
data with hi perceived risk and hi risk aversion, respectively. The results indicate that the slope
40coeﬃcient is positive and increasing, as we vary the forecasting horizon from 1 to 5 years. The
R2 also go up with the forecasting horizon. The “Long Sample” and “Post-war Sample” columns
report the corresponding results based on historical data. The model-implied regression coeﬃcients
are between 0.14 and 0.60. The empirical regression coeﬃcients are comparable, between 0.11 and
0.52. The model also does a good job in matching the R2; the model-implied R2 are within 2-4
percentage points of their empirical counterparts.
E. Predicting Excess Returns with Expenditure
Interestingly, the model also implies that a macroeconomic variable – the expenditure share αt
– should be a good forecasting variable. Intuitively, the model implies that αt is high in severe
recessions, when expected excess returns are high. To investigate this implication of the model, we
again simulate 50,000 samples from the model at the two sets of benchmark preference parameters.
For each simulated sample path, we regress log excess stock returns on a constant and the log
expenditure share lnαt. The “Model” columns in Panel A of Table 5 report the average slope
coeﬃcient and the average R2 from these regressions. The results show that the expenditure share
predicts excess returns with a positive sign. The slope coeﬃcient increases from 2.0 to 9.3 as the
forecasting horizon increases from 1 to 5 years. The 5-21 percent R2 are comparable to the 5-21
percent R2 in Table 4 based on the dividend-yield, and they also rise with the horizon.
The “Long Sample” columns run the corresponding regression results with historical data over
the whole sample, while the “Post-war Sample” results use the post-war period. We can see
that both the 1.6-10.7 slope estimates and the 2-22 percent R2 are comparable to those in the
model. Panel B of Table 5 reports the results from regressing historical excess returns on both
the expenditure share and the dividend yield. The results indicate that the expenditure share
outperforms the log dividend yield, especially over longer forecasting horizons. The t-statistics of
the expenditure-share coeﬃcient are larger, while the slope coeﬃcients and R2 from the univariate
regression in Panel A remain almost intact. Like many macroeconomic models, returns in our setup
are driven by only a few shocks. This implies that the two variables are highly correlated, and so
it does not make sense to run this horse race in the simulated data.
41Predictability of excess returns – both in our model and in the data – crucially depends on
whether the price-dividend ratio is stationary. In our model, price-dividend ratios inherit their
the persistence properties of the log expenditure ratio lnzt. From Table 1, we know that lnzt
is highly persistent; its autocorrelation is .964 estimated over the long sample and .83 over the
postwar sample. In what follows, we discuss theoretical and statistical reasons to believe that the
log expenditure ratio is stationary, and evidence that suggests that the predictability results in
Table 5 do not suﬀer from small-sample bias.
Table 5. Predicting Excess Stock Returns With The Expenditure Share
Panel A. Regressions on Expenditure Share
Horizon Model Long Sample Post-war Sample
hi perceived risk hi risk aversion
(years) slope R2 slope R2 slope t-stat R2 slope t-stat R2
1 2.00 0.05 2.40 0.06 1.36 1.47 0.02 1.42 1.68 0.03
2 3.80 0.09 4.55 0.10 3.30 2.03 0.07 3.68 2.24 0.08
3 5.42 0.13 6.50 0.14 5.01 2.40 0.14 6.25 3.21 0.20
4 6.88 0.16 8.25 0.18 6.58 2.84 0.18 8.63 3.95 0.28
5 8.19 0.19 9.83 0.21 8.44 3.65 0.22 10.73 4.92 0.30
Panel B. Regression On Expenditure Share and Dividend-Yield




(years) slope t-stat slope t-stat R2 slope t-stat slope t-stat R2
1 0.10 2.04 0.43 0.44 0.07 0.10 1.84 0.50 0.13 0.08
2 0.17 1.60 1.75 1.11 0.14 0.16 1.39 2.14 0.75 0.14
3 0.15 1.01 3.65 1.77 0.18 0.10 0.66 5.30 2.11 0.21
4 0.16 0.86 5.08 2.29 0.20 0.06 0.30 8.09 3.04 0.28
5 0.28 1.49 5.87 2.64 0.26 0.15 0.81 9.24 3.43 0.31






constant and the log expenditure share lnαt for n =1,...,5years. The“Model”columns
contain the average slope and R2 over 50,000 simulated samples with 65 observations.
The model with hi perceived risk is the bold-face parameterization in Table 3 with ε
= 1.05, β = 0.99, and 1/σ = 5. The model with hi risk aversion is the bold-face
parameterization in Table 3 with ε = 1.25, β = 1.24, and 1/σ = 16. The “Long
Sample” columns run regressions with historical 1936-2001 data, and the “Post-war
Sample” columns use 1947-2001 data. T-statistics are based on Newey-West standard




t+j on a constant, lnαt, and the log dividend yield ln1/vs
t.
42To see the theoretical reasons, consider a model where lnzt is a random walk. In this setup, the
probability that the process lnzt will stay within some ﬁnite range [lnz,lnz] forever is zero. This
implies that the probability that the expenditure share αt will stay within the ﬁnite range [α,α]
with α = z/(1+z)a n dα = z/(1+z) is zero as well. Economically, this means that expenditures on
housing will either become negligible or dominant over time – both cases are implausible. Even in
ﬁnite samples, the random-walkspeciﬁcation implies that there is a high probabilityof observing αt-
values outside the range of values A =[ .81,.87] ever observed historically. For example, simulations
show that Pr(αt / ∈ A for some t ≤ 100) = 90%, if we assume that lnzt is a random walk.
To investigate the statistical evidence for stationarity, we test for a unit root by conducting a
series of augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. We use Schwarz and Akaike criteria to select the
maximum lag length k of lagged diﬀerence terms in the ADF test equation. For the full sample, k
equals 1 and 9, respectively, and we reject the null of a unit root even at the 1% level. Of course,
the evidence against a unit root is weaker in the postwar sample. We are not able to reject the null
at conventional test sizes in this shorter sample.
The persistence of the expenditure share raises the concern that the predictability regressions
in Table 5 give biased results in small samples. Stambaugh (1999) derives a formula for the bias for
the slope coeﬃcient in univariate regressions. The formula expresses the bias as some multiple b
times the small-sample bias in the autoregressive coeﬃcient of the right-hand side (RHS) variable,
which is typically negative. The multiple b is the ratio of the covariance of the innovations of RHS
and LHS variables divided by the RHS innovation variance.11 For the log expenditure share used
i nT a b l e5 ,w ee s t i m a t eb to be equal to −2.0, −1.3, −0.1, −2.9, and 5.2 estimated over the long
sample at the 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 year horizon, respectively.
This suggests that the bias is small. For example, at the 1 year horizon, we estimate the autore-
gressive coeﬃcient of lnαt to be .96. The downward bias in this estimate is at most 0.04. Therefore,
the bias in the slope coeﬃcient is below 0.08, which is small relative to the slope coeﬃcient of 1.36
in Table 5. Similar results obtain for the other horizons; in fact, the positive b estimate for the
11To be precise, Stambaugh (1999) considers the regressions: yt = α + βxt−1 + ut and xt = θ + ρxt−1 + vt.
Stambaugh’s Proposition 4 derives the following expression for the small sample bias: E[ˆ β −β]=b×E[ˆ ρ−ρ], where
b =c o v ( ut,v t)/var(vt). To compute the bias for longer horizons n, we take the errors ut and vt from the regression
equations yt = α+ βxt−n + ut and xt = θ + ρxt−n +vt estimated with data sampled at dates 1,1+n, 1+2 n,...,s o
that there is no overlap.
435-year horizon even biases against ﬁnding predictability. Intuitively, the reason for this ﬁnding is
that, unlike the dividend yield and other commonly used predictor variables, the expenditure share
is a macroeconomic variable and thus covaries less with returns. This lower covariance helps avoid
small sample bias.
As an alternative check, we ran the predictability regressions with non-overlapping data. To be





t+j on a constant and the log expenditure share
lnαt for t =1 ,1+n,1+2 n,...and n =1 ,...,5 years. The resulting slope coeﬃcient estimates
are 1.4, 1.8, 5.4, 8.0, and 7.6 with t-statistics of 1.5, 1.2, 2.8, 3.9 and 3.7. Although concern about
small-sample bias will always remain, these diﬀerent pieces of evidence show that the results in
Table 5 are not obviously biased.
F. GMM based on Euler equations
Up to now, we have solved for returns implied by the model at a range of values for the preference
parameter ε. It is also possible to estimate ε from Euler equations based on return data. We









= 0 based on the pricing kernel
(9). We ﬁx the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion at 1/σ = 5 and estimate ε using GMM with
excess stock returns (i = s). This approach reﬂects our prior that risk aversion should be low.
(The value for the discount factor β does not matter for excess returns). The resulting estimate
for ε is 1.17 and its 95% conﬁdence interval is [1.014,∞). To compute this conﬁdence interval, we
use the fact that the GMM objective function JT multiplied by the number of observations T is χ2
distributed under the hull hypothesis. Speciﬁcally, we evaluate the GMM objective function JT(ε)
for diﬀerent values of ε and determine the parameter region for which T × JT(ε) is smaller than
its 5% critical value. The usual GMM standard errors turn out to be huge, independently of the
number of lags in the Newey-West weighting matrix.
When we add housing returns (i = s,h) as a second moment, the estimate is 1.24 and its 95%
conﬁdence interval is [1.015,∞). The J-test statistic is 0.31, which is smaller than the 5 percent
χ2(1) critical value, 3.84, so we fail to reject the model. To summarize, the GMM estimation results
are not very informative, but at least the point estimates are roughly consistent with the values we
44used earlier — ε is above 1.
VI Conclusion
We introduce an equilibrium model for asset pricing with housing. Agents care about the compo-
sition of a consumption basket that contains shelter and other goods. We calibrate the model to
data on non-housing consumption and housing expenditures. Compared to the standard CCAPM,
our model implies higher equity and housing premia, higher stock return volatility, a lower riskfree
rate which is not volatile, and lower bond premia. It also predicts that the dividend-yield and
the non-housing expenditure share αt forecast future excess stock returns. We document that the
expenditure share αt predicts excess stock returns in the data better than does the dividend yield.
This is particularly interesting, because – contrary to common predictor variables – αt is not based
on asset market data.
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A. Microevidence on Expenditure Shares
We use data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to obtain some microevidence on
expenditure shares. Table A1 reports summary statistics of the housing expenditure share across
diﬀerent groups of households. The groups are classiﬁed by income quintile, region of residence,
age of the person who rents or owns the house, race, number of persons in the household, housing
tenure, and education. For renters, the data on housing expenditures just measures rent. For
homeowners, the data measures actual expenditures on shelter (such as mortgage interest and
charges, maintenance, repairs, insurance, property taxes and other expenses) and do not include
expenditures on household operation, housekeeping supplies etc.
Table A1. Microevidence On Expenditure Shares From The CEX
Income Quintiles Regions
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Northeast Midwest South West
mean 17.8 20.0 18.0 16.4 16.9 19.9 16.2 15.8 20.4
std 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.81 .00 .70 .9
Age Race
<25 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ Hispanic Non-Hisp.
mean 18.9 20.0 18.8 16.7 15.5 15.6 17.5 20.3 18.5
std 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.3 0.9 0.9 0.50 .5
Number of Persons Home Race
1 2 3 4 5+ Owner Renter Black Non-Black
mean 21.6 17.1 17.0 17.3 17.2 16.4 21.8 18.9 17.7
std 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.1 0.8 1.01 .11 .30 .9
Education
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
mean 18.2 17.7 18.2 19.9 19.9 19.9 18.1 18.5
std 0.50 .50 .50 .60 .50 .80 .40 .4
Note: Annual data 1984-2002 from the CEX. The series of 5+ persons per households
starts in 1988. The series on hispanics/non-hispanics starts in 1994. The education
series start in 1996. The levels correspond to the following: I = less than highschool,
II = high school graduate, III = associate degree, IV = college degree, V = Bachelor’s
degree, VI = Master, professional doctorate, VII = less than college graduate, VIII =
high school with some college.
50Table A1 reports average housing expenditure shares together with their standard deviations
over time (in brackets). The data are the available annual CEX series for the years 1984-2002.
Table A1 suggests that average expenditure shares across diﬀerent household characteristics are
very similar. For example, poorer households do not seem to spend much more on housing than
richer households. The lowest income quintile spends 17.8% on housing, while the highest quintile
spends 16.9%. This ﬁnding is further supported by the fact that education levels do not seem to
matter much for expenditure shares. The households with less than a highschool degree spend
18.2% on housing, while households with higher degrees (such as masters and doctorates) spend
19.9%. These facts suggest that the homogeneity assumption on preferences is not contradicted by
these data. Another interesting ﬁnding is that older households do not seem to spend much less on
housing. For example, households that are 75 years and older spend 17.5%, whereas the youngest
households spend 18.9 and 20%.
By and large, the diﬀerences in averageexpenditure shares in Table A1 seem small. Interestingly,
the housing expenditure shares do not vary much over time. Most standard deviations in Table
A1 are below 1% per year. The highest standard deviation is the 1.8% number in the Northeast.12
These values are amazingly consistent with the standard deviation of the aggregate expenditure
share in Table 1.
To summarize, the CEX evidence does not reveal large diﬀerences in expenditure shares across
diﬀerent groups of households. For each group, the CEX evidence also suggests that these ex-
penditure shares are not volatile over time. This microevidence therefore conﬁrms the aggregate
evidence from Section IV – preferences are diﬀerent from Cobb-Douglas, but ε is still close to 1.
12It is tempting to interpret these standard deviations as standard errors for average expenditure shares. This is,
however, not appropriate, since it ignores CEX measurement error within groups.
51B. Data on Housing Returns
This appendix deﬁnes our NIPA-based measure of house prices and compares it with returns based
on alternative measures. We deﬁne housing returns according to the NIPA tables as follows. The
real housing value ph
t ht is recorded in NIPA Fixed Asset Tables 2.1, line 68. This series computes
the nominal housing value using the current value method which measures the current market value
of the assets (as opposed to the historical value method, which measures the book value of assets.)
The series records the year-end value of residential housing structures. To include the value of
land, we assume that land prices are perfectly correlated with the price of structures. Using Census
data, we estimate that the value of the land is 36% of the total housing value. We therefore adjust
houses prices to ph
t /(1 − 0.36). The dividends on housing are rent payments during that year, qtst.
We follow Flavin and Yamashita (2002) and assume that maintenance roughly equals depreciation,
so that we need to subtract δph
t−1ht−1 from dividends. We also subtract net real property tax
payments (1 − 0.33)×0.025×ph
t−1ht−1, where the marginal tax rate is assumed to be 33% and the











− δ − (1− 0.33)× 0.025.
The summary statistics in Table 1 are based on this deﬁnition of returns.
Davis and Heathcote (2005) use the price index for new residential investment from NIPA Table
7.6, line 38, as measure of house prices ph
t . This series is a chain-type price index for investment in
private residential structures starting in 1947, and it does also not include the value of land. This is
the index that mimics our index the closest among all the indexes; the correlation of price changes
between this index and our house price index is 0.80.
An alternative price index is provided by the Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO). Starting in 1975, this index tracks the changes in the value of single family homes
through repeat sales using the mortgage transaction data provided by Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. The OFHEO index reﬂects the cost of structures and land, simultaneously controlling for
the quality of the house. The series, however, does not go back very far. The correlation of price
changes with our index is 0.71 over the 25 years where we have data on the OFHEO index.
52The National Association of Realtors (NAR) publishes indexes that report median house prices
starting early 1960s. The Bureau of the Census also reports median and average sale prices of
houses sold in the United States since 1963. These indexes do not control for quality of the median
house. The Census Bureau also publishes constant-quality price indexes that do not include the
value of the land, but correct for the quality problem. These indexes are also available starting
early 1960s.
Flavin and Yamashita (2001) use PSID data on house prices to estimate the housing returns
over the 1968-1992 period. Unlike the other house price measures we just discussed, PSID house
price data is at the homeowner level. Returns can therefore be computed for individual houses.
There is, however, no rent data accompanying house prices in the PSID. Flavin and Yamashita
therefore compute real housing returns as:
(22)
ph









+ rf +0 .33× 0.025,
where rf denotes the average real short term interest rate, the personal tax rate τ is set to be 33%
and property tax rate is set to 2.5%. Flavin and Yamashita set rf to be 5% which seems too high
in our sample. We compute rf using our data.
There are two main reasons that make our house price measure (21) superior to other alter-
natives in our analysis. First, ours is the only measure that goes back until the 1930s. Second,
we have rents (housing expenditures) that correspond to our house price series. Table B1 reports
summary statistics on individual housing returns from Flavin and Yamashita (2001, Table 1A)
and our aggregate housing returns series. We compute aggregate housing returns using Flavin and
Yamashita’s (FY) return deﬁnition (22), and using our deﬁnition based on rent data (21).
Table B1 shows that average returns on individual housing are more than 3 times as high as
those on aggregate housing. The diﬀerence in standard deviations is even more striking. Returns
on individual houses are more than 5 times as volatile as returns on the U.S. housing stock as a
whole. The last columns in Table B1 shows that rent data only matters little for the volatility of
aggregate returns.
53Table B1. Various Measures Of Real Returns On Housing
FY deﬁnition (Eq.22) Our deﬁnition (Eq.21)
1968-1992 1968-1992
PSID data Our data Our data
mean 6.59 1.80 1.97
std 14.24 2.74 2.81
Note: This table reports mean and standard deviation of real housing returns. The
ﬁrst column reports the ﬁndings in Flavin and Yamashita (2001, Table 1A), the second
column is (22) evaluated with our house price index. The third column is (21) evaluated
with our house price index. Returns are deﬂated using the price index that corresponds
to our deﬁnition of non-housing consumption ct.
Table B2 presents real returns on housing using the FY deﬁnition of returns with diﬀerent
house price indexes that are discussed before. The mean returns on housing are around 2-3% for all
indexes and time periods, and the standard deviation of returns are in the 1.5-3% range except the
last column. In the last column, housing return statistics are calculated for each state separately
using OFHEO state level house price indexes and then averaged. Going from the aggregate to the
state level, the volatility of housing returns almost doubles. Idiosyncratic housing returns are still
more than 2 times as volatile as state-level housing returns.
Table B2. Real Returns On Housing Using The FY Definition
Our data DH data OFHEO data
aggregate state level
1947-2000 1948-2000 1975-2000 1975-2000
mean 1.96 2.00 2.82 2.51
std 2.21 1.70 3.19 5.86
Note: This table reports mean and standard deviation of real housing returns using
the FY deﬁnition (22). The ﬁrst column is based on our house price index. The second
column is based on the price index for new residential investment as used in Davis and
Heathcote (2005). The third and fourth columns are based on the OFHEO price indexes
at aggregate and state levels, respectively. Returns are deﬂated using the price index
that corresponds to our deﬁnition of non-housing consumption ct.
54C. Cointegration of Real Rents and Relative Housing Quantity
The ﬁrst-order condition (6) relates the relativequantity of housing consumption st/ct tothe relative
price of housing consumption ps
t/pc
t. The key parameter in this relationship is the intratemporal











between log relative quantities and log real rents.
Table C1 presents the results of this exercise. The Johansen-test for cointegration of lnst/ct
and lnps
t/pc
t strongly rejects the null of no integration. (We allow for linear trends in the data,
and include 2 lags.) Over the full sample, the estimate of ε implied by the estimated cointegrating
equation is 1.27, greater than 1, indicating that housing st and non-housing consumption ct are
substitutes. The 0.16 standard errors indicate that ε is not likely to be below one. In other words,
we ﬁnd that the utility function is not likely to be Cobb-Douglas. Over the post-war sample, the
estimate of ε is 0.77, below 1. The 0.22 standard errors are, however, larger over this sample.
Table C1. Estimation Of Intratemporal Elasticity
LR ε
21.75 [20.04] 1.27 (0.16)
Post-war Sample
21.41 [20.04] 0.77 (0.22)
Note: The ﬁrst two columns reports the likelihood ratio of the Johansen-test for coin-
tegration and the corresponding 1% critical value in square brackets. The last two
columns reports ε from the cointegrating equation (23) and the standard errors in
round brackets. The estimates are obtained using the full sample 1936-2001 and the
post-war sample 1947-2001.
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